notorious Fugitive Slave Act, which required the rendition of runaway slaves and provided for the punishment of those who aided them,17 may have been modeled on provisions in the Merchant Seamen's Act of 1790, which dealt with the problem of shipjumping sailors.18
There is no denying that the legal regimes under which enslaved Africans and merchant seamen toiled were very different. The horrors suffered by Africans on the middle passage from Africa to North America and the subsequent sufferings they and their descendants endured in the fields, shops, and households of the eastern seaboard and the Caribbean were far greater than those inflicted on seamen.19 Seamen were bound to a single voyage and had some legal protections. 20 Nonetheless, there are interesting similarities between the two groups.
Like slaves, merchant seamen stand out as an anomaly in the nineteenth century, an era otherwise supposedly devoted to the ideal of free labor. Like slaves, merchant seamen (along with fishermen) were subject to federal laws providing for their forced return to their toils if they deserted. 21 However, the source of Congress's power to so legislate is not apparent on the face of the Constitution. In the nineteenth century, the 17. Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 , ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (1793 
18. Merchant Seamen's Act, ch. 29, 1 Stat. 131 (1790) . The provisions of the Merchant Seamen's Act were made applicable to sailors in the fisheries in 1792. Act of Feb. 16, 1792 , ch. 6, 1 Stat. 229 (1792 ENGLAND, 1698 ENGLAND, -1725 ENGLAND, , at 154-89 (1991 (describing the passage of one vessel engaged in the slave trade and estimating the mortality rate of Africans during the middle passage). See generally HUGH THOMAS, THE SLAVE TRADE:
THE STORY OF THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE 1440 -1870 (1997 .
20
.
3 KENT, supra note 17, at *181-97.
21
See infra Part I.
Supreme Court ostensibly resolved this difficulty by deciding that both the Fugitive Slave Clause22 and the grant of admiralty jurisdiction23 implied that Congress has legislative powers not specifically included in the various grants found in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.24
This article explores the relationship between the law of maritime labor and the law of slavery. In the eighteenth century, both were part of a whole range of unfree labor relations. In the nineteenth century, both remained unfree labor even as the rest of the working world increasingly depended on monetary and contractual relations.
Additionally, both slaves and sailors labored in a world subject to federal legislation, the authority for which was unclear. Part one of this article examines the Fugitive Slave S. 36, 41 (1943) . Professor David Robertson, however, has argued that Butler was the first case in which that recognition took place. See DAVID W. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 142-44 (1970) .
maritime labor market and the problems of slave labor and notes the similarities between the two. Part four looks at nineteenth century developments in the control of both maritime labor and fugitive slaves. Part five demonstrates some connections between the legal regimes governing slave and maritime labor. The article concludes with some thoughts on the relationship between labor and the implicit powers of the federal government.
I. THE MERCHANT SEAMEN'S ACT AND THE FUGITIVE SLAVE ACT.
A. The Merchant Seamen's Act
In 1790, Congress enacted a bill that provided for the summary seizure of laborers fleeing from their work and for their return to their place of work. 25 The act also provided for the punishment of anyone attempting to aid a laborer who was fleeing his master. 26 The laborers subject to the act were not slaves or indentured laborers, but sailors. 27 The act was not the Fugitive Slave Act, which would later be passed by the Second Congress in 1793,28 but the Merchant Seamen's Act.29
The Merchant Seamen's Act originated just over a year after the new federal government came into being. On April 29, 1790, the House of Representatives appointed a committee to prepare a bill for the government of seamen in the merchant service. 30 The bill was presented to the House and, after some minor amendments, was passed provided that a ship's mate, along with the majority of the crew, had the right to have their vessel inspected for its seaworthiness.40 Section four prohibited debts in excess of one dollar from being collected from seamen while engaged in a voyage.41 Section six provided for regular payment of wages and for penalties for the non-payment of wages.42
Section eight required that vessels that weighed over 150 tons and were manned by more than ten sailors have ample medical supplies,43 and section nine specified the minimum provisions per person that the ship must carry on transatlantic voyages.44
These provisions arguably protected the personal safety of seamen and, by giving them a certain amount of economic security, may have encouraged them to join the merchant service.
These beneficent provisions were, however, balanced by coercive ones.45 Section two set out penalties for seamen who failed to put themselves on board at the appointed hour.46 Section three provided that any seaman who failed to sail on a vessel that had been deemed seaworthy after inspection would be subject to both imprisonment without the rights of bail, main prize, or habeas corpus, and a fine in the amount of twice the seaman's advance.47 Section four set out a penalty for harboring fugitive seamen of $10 for each day the seaman was kept in hiding, with half the penalty going to the person prosecuting the action and the other half to the United States.48 Section five provided that if a seaman was absent without leave for any period less than forty-eight hours, he would forfeit three days wages for every day he was absent. 49 Moreover, if a seaman was absent for greater than forty-eight hours, he forfeited all of his wages and all his goods and chattels that were already onboard the vessel, and was required to pay the master of the vessel for any damages sustained as a result of his absence.50 Section seven provided that the master of a vessel could obtain the arrest of an absent or deserting seaman simply by demonstrating that the seaman had signed a contract; the arrested seaman would then be confined until the vessel on which the seaman had agreed to sail was ready to leave, at the wish of the vessel's master, and the master could deduct the cost of the confinement from the seaman's wages. The House of Representatives's committee proposed "a bill respecting fugitives from justice and from the service of masters." 67 As originally proposed, the bill contained three sections. 68 Section one required the executive authority of any state or territory to arrest and turn over fugitives who were wanted in another state or territory. 69 Section two provided that any person "held to labours" in a state or territory who fled to another state or territory could be seized by his master and taken before any judge or magistrate, who, "upon proof to the satisfaction of such judge or magistrate, either by oral testimony or affidavit," would issue a certificate allowing the master to remove the fugitive to the state from which he had fled. 70 The second section also allowed a master unable to seize a fugitive to apply to any judge or magistrate for a warrant to effect the arrest of the fugitive. 71 Section three provided for unspecified fines against officers refusing to arrest, and anyone hiding or obstructing the arrest of, a fugitive from labor; these fines could be recovered by the master through an action in either the federal circuit or district court. 72 After it left the committee, the bill was further amended. In its final form, it included a new section two, which provided for punishment of any person who freed a fugitive from justice who was being transported to the state from which he had fled by a
65
. fine of not more than $500 and a term of imprisonment of not more than one year. 73 The third section contained no provision for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of fugitives from labor whom their masters had been unable to seize. 74 The final section, now the fourth, contained no penalties for interfering with the arrest of a fugitive from labor and set the fine for helping a fugitive at $500, recoverable by the master in an action for debt in any court (not just the circuit and district courts). 75 The final bill was signed into law on February 12, 1793. 76
Read together, the provisions of the Merchant Seamen's Act, designed to prevent the desertion of seamen and to provide for the recovery of those seamen who did desert, and the provisions of the Fugitive Slave Act, dealing with the recovery and return of runaway slaves, are strikingly similar. To be sure, the above comparison does reveal some notable differences. The Merchant Seamen's Act gave jurisdiction over proceedings to seize runaway seamen to the justices of the peace, while the Fugitive Slave Act gave jurisdiction over application to recover runaway slaves to any state or federal court. 77 Moreover, the penalty for harboring runaway seamen could only be recovered after a criminal conviction in state court, with half the penalty going to the party bringing the prosecution (presumably the a magistrate before seizing the seaman; 80 the Fugitive Slave Act, on the other hand, allowed a master to seize his putative chattel first and then go to a magistrate. 81 These differences, however, are not as great as they might seem at first glance.
While the Merchant Seamen's Act did not specifically provide for federal jurisdiction, those attempting to enforce seamen's articles of shipping had the option of going into the federal district courts under the courts' admiralty jurisdiction;82 even prior to the Merchant Seamen's Act the federal district courts had jurisdiction to enforce shipping articles.83 Also, while the masters of vessels seeking return of their seamen pursuant to the act were not able to get any money from the penalties imposed on persons aiding the seamen's flight, they were able to recover penalties from the seamen themselves, 84 something that the owners of fugitive slaves could not readily do because slaves had no property of their own. Finally, while masters of vessels were required to go to a justice of the peace to obtain warrants for seamen who had fled their vessels, and masters of slaves seeking the slaves' return were not required to obtain warrants, a warrant was issued as a matter of course to any ship master in possession of a written contract binding the seaman to his vessel. 85 From medieval times into the eighteenth century, the relationship between individuals and their work was judged to be one that interested the community. 87 Thus, workers could be forced to work at the harvest even if they were free men. 88 There were laws from the medieval and early modern periods requiring workers to work under the threat of physical punishment. 89 These regulations, which were based on workers' status, were understood to be no different than the regulation of other social relationships.90
In the eighteenth century, the understanding of the relationship of the worker to his master changed from a relationship based on status to one based on contract.91
However, the subject of the contract included not just labor, but the person of the laborer.
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This was most apparent in the cases of slaves, indentured servants, and apprentices.93 However, even unbound servants and laborers were viewed as having more than a contract for labor with their masters. 
SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, JOHN PAUL JONES: A SAILOR'S BIOGRAPHY 73-75 (1959).
Today, a novice sailor would learn how to tack on his or her first day on a small pleasure craft.
Morison's description, along with an explanation of a set of eighteenth century notes for staffing the maneuver, runs for nearly two pages, and it does not include an explanation of technical terms or what the individual sailors would have to do. See id.
122. The sailors of a vessel had their quarters in the forecastle, the part of the vessel in front of the main mast, from which Dana's famous book describing his service as a sailor takes its title. See DANA, supra note 2. This was the part of the vessel most exposed to the action of wind and water. Despite the sailors' constant efforts to caulk the space between the vessel's planks with tar and strands of hemp fiber picked from rope, it was almost always leaky and, in the North Atlantic, cold. In addition, for many of the men, who were mostly in their teens and twenties, the confinement for months at a time Throughout the century, courts approved of all sorts of brutal and humiliating treatment of seamen, and the Merchant Seamen's Act of 1791 and its successor, the Shipping Commissioners Act of 1872, continued to allow masters to have fleeing seamen summarily seized, imprisoned, and returned to their vessels.151 Indeed, even after the Civil War, the Emancipation Proclamation, and the Thirteenth Amendment had ended slavery, federal law continued to provide for the summary return and imprisonment of runaway seamen,152 "somewhat as runaway slaves were in the days of slavery."153 was, on the whole, unfree in the nineteenth century, why were maritime laborers unfree in a different way than their land-based counterparts?
147 See STEINFELD, FREE LABOR, supra note 15, at 147-72. 
A. The Rise of Free Labor and the Anomalous Position of Slavery and Maritime Labor
During the nineteenth century, the relationship between labor and management became increasingly monetary; the exchange was simply work for money. Neither worker nor employer had any further obligation, and when the worker ceased to give labor, the employer's only recourse was to stop giving money.154 Neither employers using corporeal punishment nor courts using the jails could or would specifically enforce labor contracts. 155 The exceptions to this trend in labor were slaves and seamen. As is well known, up until the end of the Civil War, the federal government made it increasingly easy for slave owners and putative slave owners to claim fugitive slaves and, indeed, any person of African descent claimed to be a slave.156 As may be less well known, the lot of sailors remained much the same as it had been when Congress passed the Merchant Seamen's Act. 157 While the flogging of merchant sailors was prohibited in 1850,158 sailors 154. See STEINFELD, FREE LABOR, supra note 15, at 147-73.
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Id. at 147-49.
156. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 103, at 231-51 (discussing the treatment of fugitive slaves from 1850 to 1864).
157
. See Merchant Seamen's Act, ch. 29, 1 Stat. 131 (1790).
158. See Act of Sept. 28, 1850 , ch. 60, 9 Stat. 513, 515 (1850 (appropriating money for the Navy to provide mail service with the proviso that "flogging in the navy and on board vessels of commerce, be, and the same is hereby, abolished from and after the passage of this act"). The elimination of flogging in the merchant service appears to have been placed into the proviso to eliminate flogging in the Navy by Senator Yulee, an opponent of the bill, in an effort to get northern senators to vote against it. The amendment passed without any debate. See 1850 CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 2060 (1850); see also 1850 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 691 (1850). It did not, however, prevent the proviso from being adopted, nor, unsurprisingly, did it stop the naval appropriations bill that it was a part of from becoming law. For an interesting discussion of the regional politics and psychology behind continued to be subject to the physical correction of their masters and to summary seizure, jailing, and return to their vessels should they attempt to flee. 159 Even after involuntary servitude, and with it chattel slavery, had been eliminated by the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress increased the penalties on ship-jumping sailors, and the Supreme Court held that the abolition of involuntary servitude had done nothing to change the conditions under which seamen labored. 160
1. The Growth of Employment at Will
As Robert Steinfeld has explained, during the nineteenth century the understanding that employers had some sort of proprietary interest in their employees started to fade.161 Courts questioned, and eventually denied, the rights of employers to specifically enforce their contracts of employment and to physically correct their employees. 162 According to Steinfeld, by the end of the eighteenth century hired adult laborers were not subject to physical correction by their employers or to punishment by the law if they left their employment.163 Only poor debtors and minors bound to either service or apprenticeship were subject to physical coercion.164 By the fourth decade of the nineteenth century, courts had completely rejected the physical power of employers over their employees and had refused to specifically enforce employment relations. 165 the debates in Congress, see GLENN, supra note 10, at 113-17.
159
. § 7, 1 Stat. at 134. 161. See STEINFELD, FREE LABOR , supra note 15, at 147-72.
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1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 218-21 (1796).
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. See STEINFELD, FREE LABOR, supra note 15, at 149-53.
Slaves and Sailors: A Class Apart
Even as the nineteenth century moved away from the concept that an employer had the right to physically control his employees, the power of slave owners to restrain their labor force grew. Similarly, the nineteenth century saw little diminution in the power of ships' captains over the seamen under their command.
With the rise of abolitionism, many northern states passed laws making the rendition of fugitive slaves more difficult by according the purported slaves at least a modicum of due process. 175. See DANA, supra note 2, at 415 (predicting that "the infliction of [corporal punishment] upon intelligent and respectable men will be an enormity which will not be tolerated by public opinion, and by juries, who are the pulse of the body politic"). PLEASE PROVIDE PAGE NUMBER.
176. There are, of course, problems in using reported decisions as a basis for empirical findings. The point, however, is not that seamen lost personal injury actions at any greater or lesser rate as the nineteenth century progressed, but rather that, throughout the middle and latter part of the nineteenth century, when employers on land had no right to "correct" their employees, members of the bench were willing to tolerate fairly harsh physical abuse of seamen.
concluded that a "blow with a dirty frying pan" or "wiping a dirty knife" on the face of the person whose duty it was to keep those articles clean was not an aggravated or cruel assault.177 For those who might be inclined to conclude just the opposite, the court explained that "[n]obody will believe that the law which governs the deportment of men on shore to each other, can be applied to their habits and conduct on board of a ship."178
Over twenty years later, the Federal District Court for the District of California ruled that it was neither cruel nor excessive punishment to keep two waiters ironed together for ten hours for fighting in the cabin of a vessel.179 In 1876, the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas considered an action brought by a sailor who claimed, and apparently proved, that he had been punished by his hands being tied behind his back and being hung from under his arms so that his "toes just touched the deck."180 The plaintiff was awarded $300 in damages, but, on a motion for a new trial, the court concluded that the punishment would not have been unreasonable if the plaintiff's hands had been fastened before him. 181 The court then denied the motion for a new trial, but only on the condition that the plaintiff accept a reduction of the verdict to $50.182 Two years later, in an action for damages by a steamship chambermaid against the master of a ship on which she had served, the evidence revealed that the chambermaid had threatened the master with a lump of coal, and the master had kicked the coal from her hand and hit her in the In 1895, The Red Record, a publication of the sailors' union, told its readers that over the prior seven years fourteen men had been killed by shipboard discipline; it also gave numerous examples of sadistic treatment for which masters had received little or no punishment. 186 In one case where seamen had complained that their vessel was undermanned, they had been beaten, put in irons, and locked in the forecastle for two weeks. 187 The shipping commissioner had ruled that this was justifiable discipline. 188 In another case that resulted in an acquittal, a mate had bitten a seamen so that "a piece There may be pirates or mutineers among them; and one bad man will often infect all the rest; and it is almost certain that some of them will be ignorant foreigners, hardly understanding a word of our language, accustomed all their lives to no influence but force, and perhaps nearly as familiar with the use of the knife as with that of the marlin-spike.198
Six decades later, Andrew Furuseth, the maritime labor organizer, would complain that the American merchant service was manned by "the residuum of the population, not 
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See supra text accompanying notes 1-9; see also DANA, supra note 2, 415 (stating "o one can have a greater abhorrence of the infliction of such punishment than I have, and a stronger conviction that severity is bad policy with a crew").
198. Id. 
